In this paper, we examine the properties of prediction market prices when risk averse traders have heterogeneous beliefs in state probabilities. We show that the equilibrium state prices equal the mean beliefs of traders about that state if and only if the traders' common utility function is logarithmic. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition ensuring that the state prices are systematically below or above the mean beliefs of traders, thus providing a rational explanation to the favorite-longshot bias in prediction markets.
Introduction

General motivation
Prediction markets are one of the most efficient tools to elicit people's beliefs ( Given the development of prediction markets, it is crucial to understand theoretically what prediction market prices exactly predict. In particular, it is important to understand the relationship between these prices and the probabilistic beliefs of traders about future events. In this paper, we examine theoretically one specific question about this relationship, namely under which conditions prediction market prices equal the mean of traders' beliefs. In other words, we study when a prediction market is, or is not, well calibrated on average (Page and Clemen 2013).
Main results
We consider a two-state prediction market model in which traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs about future states (Gjerstad 2004 , Manski 2006 , Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006 .
We obtain two main results. Firstly, we derive the exact necessary and sufficient condition for prediction market state prices to be equal to the mean beliefs of traders about that state. This condition holds for all possible distribution of beliefs if and only if the traders' common utility function is logarithmic. We also provide a sufficient condition on the distribution of beliefs for all possible common utility functions. Secondly, when prediction market prices are different from the mean beliefs, we characterize the determinants of that difference. Most significantly, we exhibit the necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium price to be always below or always above the mean beliefs for all symmetric belief distributions. More precisely, there exists a favorite-longshot bias, meaning that the high-likelihood events are underpriced and the low-likelihood events are overpriced, if and only if the traders' risk preferences are such that twice absolute risk aversion is less than absolute prudence. Under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) γ this condition is equivalent to γ < 1. That is, when traders' utility is less risk averse than the logarithmic utility, we provide a rationale to the well documented favorite-longshot bias (Ali 1977 , Thaler and Ziemba 1988) . In a discussion on the extension to a many-state prediction market, we show that the equilibrium state price not only depends on the distribution of beliefs about that state, but also about the other states.
Related literature
Several papers have studied trade in a prediction market by a population of individuals with heterogeneous prior beliefs, including Gjerstad (2004) , Manski (2006) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) . When traders are risk neutral and have limited investment budgets, Manski (2006) shows that the equilibrium price of the prediction market differs in general from the mean beliefs of traders. When traders are risk averse, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show theoretically that the prediction market price equals the mean of traders' beliefs when the common utility function of traders is logarithmic. Moreover, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) explore numerically how the equilibrium price is affected by belief heterogeneity for several utility functions and several belief distributions. 1 In this paper, we show that the logarithmic utility is not only sufficient but also necessary to ensure the prediction market prices equal the mean beliefs of traders for all belief distributions. More Recently, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2015) study the price underreaction when traders with heterogeneous beliefs react to public information. In all these models, Ottaviani and
Sorensen derive a sufficient condition leading to the favorite-longshot bias in a binary prediction market, which is different from the necessary and sufficient condition presented in this paper. Finally, we recall that a prediction market is a simple financial market. Therefore, this paper is also closely related to the models of asset pricing under heterogeneous 
Outline
We organize the paper as follows. In the next section we introduce a simple two-state prediction market model and derive a sufficient condition for the equilibrium state price to exist and to be unique. In Section 3, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition for prediction market equilibrium prices to be equal to the mean beliefs of traders. Then in Section 4 we examine the conditions leading to a favorite-longshot bias. Finally in Section 5 we provide a discussion on the generalization of the previous results to a prediction 2 For a justification and implications of these models see, for instance, the literature survey papers by Varian (1989) , Scheinkman and Xiong (2004) and Hong and Stein (2007) .
market with more than two states. The last section concludes. The proofs of the results presented in Section 5 are given in the Appendix.
The basic model and its equilibrium properties
We consider a simple prediction market in which traders can buy and sell a risky asset paying $1 if a specific state occurs, and nothing otherwise. The basic model relies on three important assumptions: (i) there are only two states (i.e., an event occurs or not);
(ii) the traders' prior beliefs are heterogeneous; and (iii) the traders have the same utility function and the same wealth.
Assumption (i) is a standard assumption in prediction market models; moreover, it is relaxed in Section 5 where we study a general prediction market with many states.
Assumption (ii) is the key assumption of the model. It means that traders "agree to disagree", and therefore have different prior beliefs about the states. Namely, the heterogeneity in beliefs does not come from asymmetric information but rather from intrinsic differences in how traders interpret information. This assumption has been common in economic models of prediction markets cited in the previous section. Moreover, to focus on the specific effect of belief heterogeneity, we assume (iii), that the utility function and the wealth of traders are homogeneous. 3 In the following, we derive the equilibrium properties of this basic model.
Formally, when a trader decides how much to invest in the financial asset paying $1 if an event occurs, he maximizes the following expected utility:
in which w is his initial wealth, p ∈ (0, 1) his subjective probability or belief that the event occurs, α his asset demand and π the price of this asset. 4 We assume that the trader's vNM utility function u(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and three times 3 See Remark 1 and Example 2 in the next section for a discussion on the affect of heterogeneity in wealth and the utility function of traders. 4 The individual asset demand α can be seen as the net asset demand of one asset in a model with differentiable. We first explore the properties of the individual asset demand. Proof: With the objective function (1), the first order condition is given by
in which α(p, π) is the solution of (2). Differentiating equation (2) with respect to p,
we obtain
that is, the asset demand strictly increases with belief p. Since α(p, p) = 0, we conclude that α(p, π) ≥ 0 if and only if p ≥ π.
We now introduce the prediction market with N traders, indexed by i = 1, ..., N. Each trader has a belief p i and the distribution of beliefs in the population of traders is denoted p ≡ (p 1 , ..., p N ; 1/N, ..., 1/N). Heterogeneity in p i is the only source of heterogeneity in our basic model, so that each trader i's demand for a given price π can be denoted α(p i , π).
two Arrow-Debreu assets. To see that, let α s and π s denote respectively the demand for and the price of Arrow-Debreu assets in state s = 1, 2. The objective can then be written:
. Denoting α = α 1 − α 2 and observing that π 1 + π 2 = 1 by arbitrage then leads (with π = π 1 ) to (1) .
Let π * be the equilibrium price, the equilibrium condition can thus be written
Let p = (1/N) N i=1 p i denote the mean beliefs of traders. Our main objective in this paper is to compare π * to p. In particular, in Section 3 we derive conditions so that π * = p.
Since α(p, p) = 0, notice immediately that when the belief distribution p is degenerate (i.e., p i = p for all i), then π * = p and there is no trade at the equilibrium. We rule out this homogeneous beliefs case (until Section 5), and consider a nondegenerate distribution p in the following. As another preliminary result, we show that an equilibrium always exists in our basic prediction market model.
Lemma 2.
There always exists an equilibrium price π * .
Proof : Following Lemma 1, we have α(p, π) > 0 if and only if p > π. Therefore, when π tends to 0 (respectively tends to 1) α(p, π) becomes positive (respectively negative) for all p, so that N i=1 α(p i , π) also becomes positive (respectively negative). This implies that when π increases, N i=1 α(p i , π) as a function of π must go from a positive to a negative region and thus crosses zero somewhere in between at least once. As a result, there must be a solution to (5) .
We now discuss the uniqueness of the equilibrium. This holds if
as a function of π only crosses the origin once. We know that α(p, π) has this single crossing property at π = p. But that does not guarantee that . In a prediction market with only two traders with respective beliefs of the event denoted p 1 = 0.1 and p 2 = 0.9, the equilibrium condition is equivalent to 9 − 68π + 150π 2 − 100π 3 = 0. Solving for this equation, it is found that there are three equilibrium prices in this prediction market: π * = (0.235, 0.5, 0.764).
We now provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness under decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price π * is unique if u has decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Proof : The equilibrium is unique if
is a strictly decreasing function of π. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium is α π (p, π) < 0 everywhere. Differentiating (2) with respect to π, we have
The first term is strictly negative but the second term is of ambiguous sign, so that the demand may increase when the price π increases, as it is the case in Example 1. When u has DARA, we can show that the second term of the right hand side of (6) is negative.
Let x ≡ (1 − π, −π; p, 1 − p) denote a random variable x which takes values of 1 − π and −π with probabilities p and 1 − p, respectively. The first order condition (2) can thus be written more compactly as
To show that the second term of the right hand side of (6) is negative, we thus need to
show that −αE[ xu ′′ (w + α x)] ≤ 0 with α defined in (7). Now let us introduce a concave function T so that T ′ is decreasing, implying
for all α and x. Multiplying by u ′ (w + αx) and taking expectations, this implies
Finally, let us pick T so that −u ′ = T (u). We in turn have −u ′′ = T ′ (u)u ′ which, by using the last inequality, leads to −αE[ xu ′′ (w + α x)] ≤ 0. We thus have shown that the result holds whenever −u ′ is more risk averse than u, which is equivalent to decreasing absolute risk aversion.
This result is consistent with Proposition 4 of Ottaviani and Sorensen (2015), although it is obtained in a different setting here. The intuition for this result is the following. When the price of an asset increases, there are two effects captured by the two terms on the right hand side of equation (6) . First, there is a substitution effect that leads to a decrease in its demand, but there is also a wealth effect that may potentially increase its demand.
Intuitively, as the wealth distribution deteriorates, the investor's attitude towards risk may change, and this wealth effect might prove sufficiently strong to increase the demand for the risky asset, as initially shown by Fishburn and Porter (1976) in the case of a firstorder stochastic dominance (FSD) shift. Under DARA however, the negative wealth effect leads the trader to be more risk averse, and therefore further decreases the demand for the risky asset. Under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), there is no wealth effect, and only the first negative effect is at play. Finally, we note that Example 1 features multiple equilibria because the quadratic utility function has increasing absolute risk aversion.
Finally, we observe that, when there is a unique equilibrium, one can characterize the effect of a change in the distribution of beliefs on the equilibrium price. Indeed, from the equilibrium condition
any FSD improvement in the distribution of beliefs must increase the equilibrium price.
Prediction market prices and the mean beliefs of traders
In this section, we first ask the following question: which utility functions lead the prediction market prices to equal the mean beliefs of traders, i.e. π * = p, for any belief distribution? To answer that question, we first consider a logarithmic utility function u(w) = log w. Note that this function displays DARA, and thus the equilibrium is unique from Proposition 1. In that case, we can obtain a closed-form solution to the first-order condition (2):
This implies that the equilibrium condition (5) can simply be written π * = p. This shows that the logarithmic utility function is a sufficient condition, a result already obtained in Gjerstad (2004) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) . A natural question is whether the utility function must be logarithmic to guarantee π * = p or whether this result can arise for other utility functions. That is, we want to know whether u(w) = log w is also a necessary condition. We next show that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 2 The prediction market price is equal to the mean beliefs of traders, i.e.
π * = p, for all traders' belief distributions p if and only if u(w) = log w for all w.
Proof: We just need to prove the necessity. Namely, we need to show that if
α(p i , p) = 0 for all the heterogeneous beliefs p, this must also hold for a specific case of symmetric heterogeneous beliefs with two traders having p 1 = p + δ and p 2 = p − δ for p = 1/2 and δ ∈ [0, min{p, 1 − p}]. If π * = (p 1 + p 2 )/2 = p is the equilibrium price, we must have
in which α(p + δ, p) is the unique solution of
and α(p − δ, p) is the unique solution of
Taking π = p in the last expression, we have from (4) that
.
Then rearranging yields
Therefore g ′′ (0) = 0 is equivalent to
for all w. Since p = 1/2, we have
. Finally, solving for this differential equation gives u(w) = c 1 + c 2 log(w + c 3 ) where c k , k = 1, 2, 3, are constants. Since u(w) is defined up to a positive affine transformation, and since w is arbitrary, this is equivalent to u(w) = log w.
This result shows that the prediction market price is equal to the mean beliefs of traders for all possible distributions of beliefs. This is an important result. Unfortunately, the following remarks indicate that this result does not hold in more general settings in which wealth is either heterogenous or can vary with the event.
Remark 1 (Wealth heterogeneity): The result of Proposition 2 cannot be generalized to non-common wealth, as possible correlation between wealth and beliefs would invalidate the result. Indeed, let w be the distribution representing traders' wealth heterogeneity.
Assuming a logarithmic utility function, we can obtain
Therefore there is no utility function that can always ensure prediction markets are unbiased when beliefs and wealth are potentially correlated. Observe that, despite this impossibility result, the direction of the bias can be inferred if the analyst knows the sign of the correlation between beliefs and wealth. The intuition for (11) is that richer individuals invest more, and therefore have more influence on the equilibrium price. Thus, if wealth is positively (respectively negatively) correlated with beliefs, the equilibrium price will be higher (respectively lower).
Remark 2 (Stakes): Suppose each trader has a (positive or negative) stake ∆ in the event he predicts, so that he now maximizes over α the following expected utility
Then it is easy to understand that the result of Proposition 2 is not guaranteed either.
Indeed for the logarithmic utility function we have
leading to the equilibrium condition
The intuition is that when there is a positive (respectively negative) stake, the marginal utility decreases (respectively increases) if the event occurs. As a result, the traders want to transfer wealth to the state in which the event does not occur (respectively occurs), and they typically use the prediction market as a hedging scheme to do this. The consequence is that the equilibrium is biased downwards (respectively upwards). Observe that if the stakes are individual-dependent but uncorrelated with beliefs, and if their mean across individuals is equal to zero, then we retrieve a prediction market that is unbiased under a logarithmic utility function.
The previous proposition provides the condition on the utility function so that π * = p for all belief distributions p. We now study the dual problem: what are the conditions on the belief distribution p leading to π * = p for all utility functions u? We show that the answer depends on whether the distribution of beliefs is symmetric about one half. Proof: We want to show that if p is symmetric about 1/2 then π * = p for all u. Observe from the first order condition (2) that α(p, π) = −α(1 − p, 1 − π). This implies that the equilibrium condition can be written
Observe then that p symmetric about 1/2 means that p is distributed as 1 − p. Consequently the equilibrium condition implies
Since the equilibrium is assumed to be unique, this last condition implies π
The intuition for Proposition 3 is simple. When p is symmetric about one half, the two states are formally indistinguishable. Therefore it cannot be that the price of an asset yielding one dollar in one state is different from that of an asset yielding one dollar in the other state, implying π * = 1/2.
We note, however, that if heterogeneity in individual utility functions is introduced, then the result may not hold even when p is symmetric about 1/2. The intuition is essentially the same as the one presented in Remark 1. This is illustrated by the following example which considers heterogeneity over (constant absolute) risk aversion. We have characterized the conditions leading to π * = p for all belief distributions p in Proposition 2 and for all utility functions u in Proposition 3. These conditions are rather stringent. We note, however, that one can relax them in the sense that it is possible to find well-chosen pairs (u, p) also leading to π * = p. This is shown in the following example which uses a specific CRRA utility function and a specific nonsymmetric distribution of beliefs.
Example 3 (Unbiased prediction market under CRRA and nonsymmetric beliefs). Consider traders with utility function u(w) = −1/w. Two groups of traders participate in the prediction market: one group has beliefs p 1 = p, and the other group has beliefs p 2 = 1−p.
Denoting a the proportion of traders in the first group, we have p = ap + (1 − a)(1 − p).
Note that the belief distribution among traders may not be symmetric about 1/2. One may then easily obtain that
Examples 2 and 3 indicate that the condition that the distribution of beliefs is symmetric about 1/2 is neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain π * = p in general.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the favoritelongshot bias
In the previous analysis, we have examined under which conditions the prediction market equilibrium price π * is equal to the mean beliefs p of traders. We have seen that these conditions are rather stringent, implying that a difference between the equilibrium price and the mean beliefs of traders is expected in prediction markets in general. It is therefore interesting to better characterize this difference, or "bias". In this section, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition so that the equilibrium price π * is systematically above or below the mean belief p.
The analysis developed in this section may provide a rationale for the favorite-longshot bias, namely for the empirical observation that longshots tend to be over-valued and that favorites tend to be under-valued (Ali 1977 ). More explicitly, consider a horse race with only two horses, and call the first horse the favorite (resp. longshot) if the mean beliefs that this horse wins are such that p ≥ 1/2 (resp. p ≤ 1/2). As we will see, the necessary and sufficient condition so that this horse is under-valued, i.e. π * ≤ p, critically depends on whether it is a favorite or a longshot and on the risk aversion of traders. This result is presented in the following proposition in which A(w) = −u ′′ (w)/u ′ (w) denotes Arrow-Pratt's coefficient of absolute risk aversion and P (w) = −u ′′′ (w)/u ′′ (w) denotes the coefficient of absolute prudence (Kimball 1990 ).
Proposition 4 The prediction market price is greater than the mean beliefs of traders,
i.e. π * ≥ p, for all symmetric beliefs p about the mean belief p if and only if (1/2 − p)(P (w) − 2A(w)) ≥ 0 for all w and u that imply a unique equilibrium.
Proof : Recall that, when the equilibrium is unique, π * ≥ p if and only if Eα( p, p) ≥ 0.
For symmetric distributions, this holds true if and only if for all p (hereafter denoted p)
we have
in which α(p + δ, p) is the unique solution of (8) We now prove the sufficiency. From (9), condition (12) is equivalent to
implies
We now introduce two random variables:
Then it can be verified that Ex = Eỹ = w − αδ andx is a mean-preserving spread ofỹ if and only if p ≥ 1/2. Note that φ ′′ (x) ≥ 0 if and only if P ≤ 2A. Therefore, when p ≥ 1/2 and P ≤ 2A, we have
which is equivalent to
This last inequality then leads to
where the last equality is given by (14) . This shows that the condition (15) is satisfied.
Hence π * ≥ p when p ≥ 1/2 and P ≤ 2A. Moreover, when p ≤ 1/2,ỹ is a mean-preserving spread ofx, and φ ′′ (x) ≤ 0 is equivalent to (16) , leading to π * ≥ p. The case π * ≤ p under (1/2 − p)(P − 2A) ≤ 0 can be demonstrated in an analogous fashion. This concludes the proof.
The difference between the mean beliefs p and the equilibrium price π * therefore depends on whether the mean beliefs is less than 1/2, and on whether the absolute prudence P is greater than twice the absolute risk aversion 2A. The sign of P − 2A is a familiar condition on utility functions in the comparative statics of risk (Gollier 2001 ). In particular, for CARA utility functions, we have P = A(< 2A). For CRRA utility functions u(x) = x 1−γ /(1 − γ), P < 2A is equivalent to the constant relative risk aversion γ > 1, while P > 2A is equivalent to γ < 1, and P = 2A is equivalent to γ = 1, which corresponds to the logarithmic utility function.
The result in Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 1 Observe that the result in Proposition 4 is consistent with Propositions 2 and 3.
Indeed, this result shows that the prediction market is unbiased under two extreme and separate conditions on the utility functions and the distribution of beliefs: either as in Proposition 2 when the utility is logarithmic (P = 2A) or as in Proposition 3 when mean beliefs equal one half for symmetric belief distributions. We believe that the general results and the selected numerical examples presented so far provide a fairly complete picture of the properties of equilibrium state prices of a prediction market in the two-state case. This is the case most often considered in the theoretical literature on prediction markets. We next extend our discussion to a prediction market with more than two states.
A discussion on the prediction market with many states
We have so far considered a prediction market with only two states. In this section we provide a discussion of a prediction market for any finite number S of states. We examine whether the previous results obtained for two states can be generalized to the case with more than two states. Consistent with previous notations, we denote by the vector Under CARA u(w) = −e −rw with r > 0, we have however
We now make another observation using the previous example. With the same numerical values for individual beliefs and utilities, we consider an alternative prediction market. Assume that there are only two Arrow-Debreu assets: an asset that pays $1 if state 1 occurs, and another asset that pays $1 if either state 2 or state 3 occurs. We have therefore a two-state prediction market. But since the traders' beliefs over the two states (1 − 2p, 2p) are now homogeneous, we know that the prediction market is unbiased.
Therefore, this simple observation shows that the equilibrium state price varies depending on the number of states on which it is possible to bet. In other words, this means that the "design" of the prediction market matters for equilibrium state prices. 6 Indeed, the intuition is that the design of the prediction market may affect trading opportunities under heterogeneous beliefs. Following this observation, one may ask: when is an equilibrium state price always independent from the design of the prediction market? It can be easily shown that this is the case when all traders believe that all other S − 1 states are equally likely (see Proposition 6 below).
Example 5 also shows that the equilibrium price of one state depends on the distribution of beliefs about the other states (through the parameter ǫ). One may therefore ask:
when does the equilibrium price of one state depend only on the beliefs about that state?
Interestingly the answer to this question is exactly the same as the one to the question asked above about the prediction market design. Indeed, if the equilibrium price of one state in a S−state prediction market is always equal to the equilibrium price of that state in a two-state prediction market, this precisely means that the distribution of beliefs in all the other states is irrelevant for that equilibrium state price. We state this result in the following proposition. 
Conclusion
In the last decades, academics and private-sector operators have increasingly used financial prediction markets with the primary objective to better predict future uncertain events.
This paper has derived generic theoretical conditions to ensure the equilibrium state prices in such markets are equal to the mean beliefs of traders about that state. We have shown that these conditions are very stringent, even in a setting with homogeneous traders' risk preferences and wealth. We have also provided a set of additional conditions that are informative about how prediction market prices deviate from the mean beliefs of traders.
In particular, we have identified an exact condition on risk aversion such that the favoritelongshot bias (Ali 1977 ) always holds for any symmetric belief distribution, and an exact condition on beliefs such that the equilibrium price of one state only depends on the heterogeneity of beliefs about that state.
A central assumption in our model is that traders do not update their subjective probabilities. With that assumption, we have followed the common setting adopted in the early economic papers on prediction markets ( there is a lot of evidence that people are not Bayesian. Typically, the extensive research on the "confirmation bias" in psychology shows that people tend to search for, interpret, or recall information in a way that confirms their prior beliefs. This observation suggests that the prediction market prices may depend on the specific prediction market under consideration, and in particular on the preferences and rationality of participants. Ultimately, understanding the prediction market bias is an empirical question. Since our paper characterizes theoretically some simple relationships between the prediction market prices and the traders' beliefs and risk preferences, we believe that it can provide a good basis for empirical testing.
du risque/SCOR.
Appendix: Proof of Results in Section 5
In this appendix, we setup an S-state prediction market, derive the equilibrium state prices, and provide the proofs of the Propositions and more details on the examples presented in Section 5. 
A.1 The S-state model
where λ i is the Lagrange multiplier,
is the portfolio wealth of trader i in state s, and w o is the common initial wealth.
A.2 The equilibrium state prices
Based on the setup in subsection A.1, the equilibrium state prices {π s } are determined by the market clearing condition
To derive the equilibrium state prices, we consider three types of utility functions and the results are summarized in three Lemmas.
Lemma 3. For u(x) = log(x), the equilibrium state prices are given by
that is, the state price is the mean probability belief of traders in the state.
Proof : With u(x) = log(x), the FOC (A.1) becomes
which leads to
Substituting the above expressions into (A.3) for s = S, we obtain that λ i = w o . This implies that the Lagrange multiplier λ i is a constant in this case. Applying the market clearing condition to (A.3) then leads to the equilibrium state prices (A.2).
Lemma 4. For CARA utility u(x) = −e −rx /r with r > 0, the equilibrium state prices are given by
Proof : With u(x) = −e −rx /r, the FOC (A.1) becomes
This leads to
Applying the market clearing conditions to (A.5), we obtain
for s = 1, · · · , S. Substituting (A.7) into (A.5) for s = S, we have
Aggregating (A.8) over i then leads to
Substituting (A.9) into (A.6), we then have 
Proof : With the CRRA utility function, the FOC (
Equation (A.11) implies that, for s = 1, · · · , S,
Substituting (A.12) into (A.11) for s = S and using the market clear condition, we obtain
Also, applying the market clearing condition to (A.11), we have
Combining (A.13) with (A.14) leads to the state prices π s in (A.10).
A.3 Proofs of Propositions 5 and 6
The proof of Proposition 5 follows easily from the equilibrium state prices (A. Assume then by contradiction that π j > π k for some j, k = 2, ..., S and j = k. This implies w ij < w ik , and hence α ij < α ik for all i = 1, ..., N. The last inequality cannot hold at the equilibrium due to the market clearing condition. As a result we must have π j = π k ≡ π for all j = 2, ..., S. It is immediate that each trader i must demand the same amount, say α i , for j, k = 2, ..., S. The problem of each trader i is then to select α i1 and α i to maximize
This is equivalent to a binary-prediction market in which (S −1)π denotes the equilibrium price of an Arrow-Debreu security that delivers $1 if either state j = 2, ..., S occurs.
Therefore we have S j=2 π j = (S − 1)π = π 2,S . This implies the S-state problem is equivalent to a reduced two-state problem by combining states 2 to S into one state.
Thus the equilibrium price of state 1 only depends on the beliefs of the state. 
